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In his 1989 book The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire, the British historian Alan 
Sked quotes his Hungarian colleague István Diószegi on the subject of the Austro-Hungarian 
dual foreign policy since 1867: 
 
The Habsburg Monarchy offers no classical cases to the investigator of world 
history[...] the historian [...] is unable to discover, however well-intentioned he may 
be, anything that was pioneering in Austrian history. All that happened in the 
Monarchy was nothing but a belated, second-hand, and often distorted variant of 
Western European developments. Nor is Austrian history rich in decisive events 
transcending national boundaries.
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* The British Academy provided funds which enabled visits to Austrian archives. I would also like to express 
my special thanks to Daniela Caglioti, Benno Gammerl, Kevin McDermott, and an anonymous reviewer for 
their helpful comments and suggestions. 
1 I. Diószegi, Hungarians in the Ballhausplatz: Studies on the Austro-Hungarian Common Foreign Policy, 
transl. from the Hungarian by K. Balás / M. Borsos, Budapest 1983, 9. Cited in A. Sked, The Decline and Fall 
of the Habsburg Empire, 1815-1918, Harlow 1989, 2. 
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Sked’s purpose, quite rightly, is to criticise these claims. At best, he argues, Diószegi is guilty 
of “presentism”, that is of seeing the past only as a “background to the present”, rather than 
studying it as a means to understand “how people lived under different conditions and 
thought systems”. At worst, though, his statement is in danger of normalising the western 
European model of the nation-state, or conversely, of demonising it by casting it as the 
“natural” or permanent political form of the modern, post-Enlightenment period.2 It thus 
underplays the potential lessons that the Austro-Hungarian experience provides, especially in 
terms of managing a multi-national and multi-ethnic empire under conditions of modernity.
3
 
Sked’s critique of Diószegi also has a significant bearing on the history and historiography 
of civilian internment in the Habsburg Empire during the First World War. Indeed, when we 
look at the existing literature on this subject, the most striking thing is that Austria-Hungary 
is the only one of the major combatant powers during the First World War for which there is 
still no monograph on the treatment of enemy aliens. Leaving aside the not inconsiderable 
challenges involved in working in archives in a region that has become even more 
geographically fragmented since the end of the Cold War, and with official and non-official 
documents written in several different European languages, there are two main reasons for 
this. Firstly, there is the assumption that the internment of enemy aliens and other outside 
groups in wartime is largely a reflection of the priorities of the nation-state and its 
                                                             
2 Ibid., 2-3.  
3 One early attempt to consider these lessons by investigating the “mass psychological process of the 
disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy” was O. Jászi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, Chicago, 
IL 1929 (here v).   
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mobilisation strategies during wartime.
4
 If Austria-Hungary simply represents a “second 
hand” imitation of this, then why bother investigating it? Secondly, there is a certain feeling 
of nostalgia for the Habsburg monarchy, a notion that its passing in 1918 led on to 
geopolitical instability and ethnic conflicts in central and eastern Europe, to the rise of Hitler 
and Stalin, and to concentration camp systems that were significantly crueller and more 
murderous than anything imaginable in the First World War.
5
 In other words, if discussed at 
all, Austrian-Hungary’s treatment of domestic political suspects and enemy aliens during the 
years 1914-1918 is usually seen not just as a “distorted variant” of Western European 
practices, but by and large as a more benign one. 
The genealogy of this approach is easy to trace. Already in January 1918, before the war 
had ended, the American jurist James W. Garner published an influential and oft-cited article 
in the American Journal of International Law on the treatment of enemy aliens by the 
combatant powers. In it, he devoted twelve and a half pages to the situation in Britain, five 
and a half pages to France, three pages to Imperial Germany, and barely one page to the 
Habsburg Empire. His conclusion was that, except for its treatment of Italians, Austro-
Hungarian policy towards enemy aliens was “especially lenient”. This was all the more 
remarkable, he noted, given the large-scale arrests of Habsburg subjects in Britain and 
France.
6
 Garner was right on two levels: there was indeed no wholesale internment of enemy 
                                                             
4 For a broader analysis see M. Stibbe, “Ein globales Phänomen: Zivilinternierung im Ersten Weltkrieg in 
transnationaler und internationaler Dimension”, in: C. Jahr / J. Thiel (eds.), Lager vor Auschwitz: Gewalt und 
Integration im 20. Jahrhundert, Berlin 2013, 158-176. 
5 On Habsburg nostalgia see Eric Hobsbawm’s insightful essay, “Mitteleuropean Destinies” (2003), reproduced 
in Hobsbawm, Fractured Times: Culture and Society in the Twentieth Century, London 2013, 84-95 (here esp. 
86-88).  
6 J. W. Garner, “Treatment of Enemy Aliens: Measures in Respect to Personal Liberty”, in: American Journal of 
International Law, 12 (1918) 1, 27-55 (here 52). 
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aliens in either the Austrian or Hungarian halves of the Monarchy during the First World 
War. It is also true that the Italians were dealt with more harshly than British and French 
nationals. However, as we shall see below, his claims are also highly misleading in other 
respects. In particular, most of those who were interned in Austria-Hungary during the war 
were not enemy aliens at all, but either deportees from occupied territories, or feindliche 
Inländer, internal enemies who belonged to particular subject nationalities of the empire. 
With the partial exception of the Serbs and the Italians, they did not enjoy the protection of 
the International Red Cross or of neutral embassies. And their treatment was anything but 
lenient.
7
 
During the immediate post-war period, some of the subject nationality groups who had 
suffered most under wartime Habsburg rule sought to correct this impression of a mild 
Austrian policy. In 1920, for instance, the Italian government publicised the findings of its 
Royal Commission into war crimes committed by the enemy, which included a volume 
dedicated to the mistreatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees.
8
 In the same year 
Vladimir Ćorović, a former Bosnian Serb political prisoner and now professor of history at 
the University of Belgrade, published a “Black Book” of wartime atrocities committed by 
Habsburg troops against the Serb population of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
9
 And later in the 
                                                             
7 For further evidence see M. Stibbe, “Krieg und Brutalisierung: Die Internierung von Zivilisten bzw. “politisch 
Unzuverlässigen“ in Österreich-Ungarn während des Ersten Weltkriegs”, in: A. Eisfeld / G. Hausmann / D. 
Neutatz (eds.), Besetzt, interniert, deportiert: Der Erste Weltkrieg und die deutsche, jüdische, polnische und 
ukrainische Zivilbevölkerung im östlichen Europa, Essen 2013, 87-106.  
8 Relazioni della reale commissione d’inchiesta sulle violazioni del diritto delle genti commesse dal nemico, Vol. 
3: Trattamento dei prigionieri di Guerra e degli internati civili, Rome 1920. 
9 V. Ćorović, Crna Knjiga: Patnje srba Bosne i Hercegovine za vreme Svetskog Rata 1914-1918, Belgrade, 
Sarajevo 1920 [Black Book: The Suffering of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Great War, 1914-
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1920s, Ukrainian nationalists in Lvov began writing the Thalerhof Almanach, an account of 
the inhumane conditions in which Ruthenian political suspects were kept at the Thalerhof 
camp near Graz in Austrian Styria.
10
 However, none of these works made much of an impact 
beyond their immediate national/political contexts, and even then the impact was slight.  
In Austria itself, silence reigned regarding the extent and scale of atrocities committed 
against captive civilians and deportees, including Habsburg subjects, during the war. The 
official view was reflected in an essay which appeared in the two-volume compendium on 
wartime captivity published by Hans Weiland and Leopold Kern in 1931. Its author was Hans 
Swoboda, a former Habsburg police official who had been seconded from the Austrian 
Ministry of Interior to become the Imperial government’s chief advisor on civilian internee 
affairs in 1914. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, Swoboda described Austrian measures against 
enemy aliens as restrained in comparison to those of other belligerent states, and as having 
been motivated by concern for the dignity of the persons affected and not by any desire for 
“revenge”. Internment, he argued, was a last resort undertaken only when it was “deemed 
necessary to protect ourselves”. This was underlined by reports from the Red Cross and 
neutral embassies which – according to Swoboda - confirmed “that civilian internees in 
Austria were always treated well”.11 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
1918]. On Ćorović see also R. Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism: The Habsburg “Civilizing Mission” in 
Bosnia, 1878-1914, Oxford 2007, 231-232 and 250. 
10 Talergofs’kyj al’manach: Propamjatnaja knyga avstryjs’kych žestokostej, yzuvirstv y nasylij nad karpato-
russ’kym narodom vo vremja vsemyrnoj vojny 1914-1917 gg. 4 Vols., Lvov 1924-1932 [Thalerhof Almanach: 
Book of remembrance to the Austrian atrocities and acts of violence against the Carpatho-Ruthenian people 
during the World War, 1914-1917].   
11 H. Swoboda, “Zivilinternierte in Österreich”, in: H. Weiland / L. Kern (eds.), In Feindeshand: Die 
Gefangenschaft im Weltkriege in Einzeldarstellungen, Vienna 1931, Vol. 2, 229-230.  
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While concern for defending or denigrating the reputation of the former Habsburg Empire 
gradually faded over time, after 1945 historical writing on the “camp phenomenon” was 
dominated, for understandable reasons, by a focus on the Nazi Holocaust and the Soviet 
Gulag. The first detailed academic studies of First World War internment came only in the 
1990s, alongside the growing interest in the history of minority groups in nations and empires 
at war. Over the last two decades significant monographs and specialist essays have appeared 
on the treatment of enemy aliens and/or internment practices in Britain, France, Germany, 
Italy, Romania, Russia, the USA, Brazil, Australia, and New Zealand.
12
 Yet the only 
equivalent for Austria-Hungary comes in the form of unpublished PhD theses and Masters’ 
                                                             
12 See P. Panayi, The Enemy in Our Midst: Germans in Britain during the First World War, Oxford 1991; idem., 
Prisoners of Britain: German Civilian and Combatant Internees during the First World War, Manchester 2013; 
J.-C. Farcy, Les camps de concentration français de la première guerre mondiale (1914-1920), Paris 1995; C. 
Jahr, “Zivilisten als Kriegsgefangene: Die Internierung von ‘Feindstaaten-Ausländern’ in Deutschland während 
des Ersten Weltkrieges am Beispiel des ‘Engländerlagers’ in Ruhleben”, in: R. Overmans (ed.), In der Hand des 
Feindes: Kriegsgefangenschaft von der Antike bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg, Cologne, Weimar, Vienna 1999, 297-
321; M. Stibbe, British Civilian Internees in Germany: The Ruhleben Camp, 1914-18, Manchester 2008; D. L. 
Caglioti, “Why and How Italy Invented an Enemy Aliens Problem in the First World War”, in: War in History, 
21 (2014) 2, 142-169 ; A. Siperco, Tragedii şi suferinţe neştiute: Prizonieri de război şi internaţi civili în 
România 1917-1919, Bucharest 2003; E. Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The Campaign against 
Enemy Aliens during World War I, Cambridge, MA, London 2003; J. Nagler, Nationale Minoritäten im Krieg: 
„Feindliche Ausländer” und die amerikanische Heimatfront während des Ersten Weltkrieges, Hamburg 2000; 
F. C. Luebke, Germans in Brazil: A Comparative History of Cultural Conflict during World War I, London 
1987; G. Fischer, Enemy Aliens: Internment and the Home Front Experience in Australia, 1914-1920, St. Lucia, 
Queensland 1989; and A. Francis, “To Be Truly British, We Must Be Anti-German”: New Zealand, Enemy 
Aliens and the Great War Experience, 1914-1919, Frankfurt am Main, New York 2012. 
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dissertations,
13
 or exhibition catalogues and booklets produced for the specialist local history 
market.
14
 Even the recent revival of interest in military POWs in the Habsburg Empire, such 
as Giovanna Procacci’s volume on Italians and the work of Verena Moritz and Hannes 
Leidinger on Russian prisoners pre- and post-1917, has done little to stimulate research into 
their civilian counterparts.
15
 
The aim of this article, then, is to make a start at filling an important gap in the literature. 
The underlying argument is that Austro-Hungarian policies are a key part of the story of First 
World War internment, not simply a dull or inconsequential echo of policies pursued 
elsewhere. To demonstrate this, I will refer to the incarceration of three distinct but partially 
overlapping groups: enemy aliens, “suspicious persons” deported from war zones, and 
internally-displaced refugees; and I will draw my examples mainly, but not wholly, from the 
                                                             
13 O. Haller, “Das Internierungslager Katzenau bei Linz: Die Internierung und Konfinierung der 
italienischsprachigen Zivilbevölkerung des Trentinos zur Zeit des Ersten Weltkrieges”, Dipl. Arb., University of 
Vienna 1999; R. Mundschütz, “Das Internierungslager Drosendorf/Thaya 1914-1920: Ein Beitrag zur 
Geschichte der Behandlung fremder Staatsangehöriger in Österreich während des 1. Weltkriegs”, Dipl. Arb., 
University of Vienna 1993; idem., “Internierung im Waldviertel: Die Internierungslager und –stationen der BH 
Waidhofen an der Thaya, 1914-1918”, D. Phil, University of Vienna 2002. 
14 This is especially the case with Italian internees and refugees in Austria. See e.g. E. Unterveger, Katzenau: 
Catalogo edito in occasione della Mostra alla Sala della Tromba di Trento, 16-30 novembre 1980, Trento 1980; 
V. C. Tranquillini, Rovereto Katzenau e ritorno, Rovereto 1990; D. Leoni / C. Zadra (eds.), La città di legno: 
Profughi trentini in Austria 1915-1918, Trento 1995; M. Eichta, Braunau-Katzenau-Mitterndorf: Il ricordo dei 
profughi e degli internati del Trentino, Cremona 1999; C. Ambrosi, Vite internate: Katzenau, 1915-1917, 
Trento 2008.  
15 G. Procacci, Soldati e prigionieri italiani nella Grande Guerra Turin 2000 [1993]; V. Moritz / H. Leidinger, 
Zwischen Nutzen und Bedrohung: Die russischen Kriegsgefangenen in Österreich 1914-1921, Bonn 2005. 
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Austrian half of the empire.
16
 In the final section, I will show how internment practices in the 
Dual Monarchy complicate our understanding of the history and violent legacy of First World 
War captivity as a whole. In particular, it may no longer be appropriate to assume the 
existence of a standard ”western” model of the persecution of alien minorities and subject 
nationalities in wartime from which one can identify peculiar non-western variants.  
 
1. Enemy Aliens 
Like most other belligerent states in the First World War, Austria-Hungary did not allow 
enemy nationals any period of grace to leave its sovereign territory after the outbreak of 
hostilities. Restrictions on freedom of movement and police surveillance measures were 
immediately put into place.
17
 Men of military age, but also women and older men, were the 
targets. Suspected spies were quickly taken into custody, including 95 enemy aliens arrested 
in Lower Austria and interned at Schloss Karlstein, an uninhabited property owned by Count 
van den Straten, on 18 August 1914. Among them were 56 Russians, 23 Britishers, thirteen 
Frenchmen and three Serbs.
18
 But otherwise most enemy subjects, including the vast majority 
                                                             
16 Although I cannot go into more detail here, it seems likely that a focus on the Hungarian case, with its much 
stronger emphasis on the Magyar nation as the dominant ethnic group, would produce different results. For a 
brilliant account of the differences between the Austrian and Hungarian approaches to ethnic heterogeneity in 
the pre-war period, including comparisons with policies pursued by Britain in its overseas empire, see B. 
Gammerl, Staatsbürger, Untertanen und Andere: Der Umgang mit ethnischer Heterogenität im Britischen 
Weltreich und im Habsburgerreich 1867-1918, Göttingen 2010. 
17 These measures were already outlined in a letter from the Austrian Ministry of Interior to the Statthalter 
(provincial governor) of Lower Austria, 23 July 1914, in: Niederösterreichisches Landesarchiv St. Pölten 
(henceforth NÖLA), Präs. P. Zl. 384 SA ex 1914 (Karton 691). 
18 District Commissioner in Waidhofen an der Thaya to the office of the Statthalter of Lower Austria, 20 August 
1914, in: NÖLA, Präs. P. Zl. 384 SA ex 1914 (Karton 691).  
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of British and French nationals living in Austria, remained at liberty in the first weeks of the 
war. Russians were more likely to be interned, and indeed many more were arrested after 18 
August, but even then relatively large numbers were left in freedom, especially those Russian 
Poles, Russian Jews and Ukrainians considered to be opposed to Tsarism.
19
 Even the Russian 
political emigrant Lenin, who was staying in a country retreat close to the village of Poronin 
in the Austrian province of Galicia when war broke out and was temporarily held as a 
“suspicious alien” by the authorities in nearby Nowy Targ, was allowed to proceed to 
Switzerland on 3 September 1914, largely due to the intervention of the Austrian socialist 
Victor Adler.
20
 
In the autumn of 1914 the mood towards aliens became more hostile, mainly in reaction to 
news from Britain and France regarding the alleged ill-treatment of Habsburg subjects there. 
Austrian diplomats also reported enthusiastically on the retaliatory measures being taken in 
Germany, including the arrest of around 4000 British men on 6 November and their 
incarceration at the Ruhleben camp near Berlin.
21
 Orders issued on 10 and 15 November by 
the Kriegsüberwachungsamt (KÜA), the body charged with coordinating wartime emergency 
measures in the Austrian half of the empire, called for the more rigorous implementation of 
restrictions on enemy aliens, even in the Austrian interior, and the order of 15 November 
made explicit reference to the need to treat the British particularly harshly. Instructions were 
                                                             
19 Statthalterei in Niederösterreich, Instruktion für die Behandlung fremder Staatsangehöriger in 
Niederösterreich während des Kriegszustandes, n.d. [11 August 1914], in: NÖLA,  Präs. P. Zl. 384 SA ex 1914 
(Karton 691).  
20 See R. Service, Lenin: A Biography, Basingstoke 2000, 223-225. 
21 See e.g. Austro-Hungarian consul in Dresden to the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Leopold 
Berchtold, 17 November 1914, in: Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (henceforth 
ÖStA-HHStA), F36, Karton 556, 26/2a, Zl. 15. 
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also given for the arrest of more Britishers living in Vienna and other major towns and cities, 
especially those “whose continued residency or employment in our lands is a matter of luxury 
only”, rather than being considered a “necessity”.22 The new sanctions were backed up by 
propaganda accusing the Allies, and Britain in particular, of various misdeeds and cruelties 
against Habsburg subjects.
23
 However, in contrast to Germany, there was no wholesale 
round-up of British men of military age in November 1914, and indeed the KÜA emphasised 
the importance of ensuring “that the internment measures do not damage the interests of our 
native industry and economy, or affect British subjects who are more or less to be regarded as 
pro-Austrian as a result of long-term residency in the Monarchy or close family ties with 
subjects of the Monarchy”.24 
So far, then, official Austrian policy towards enemy aliens was largely reactive and, on the 
surface at least, remarkably restrained in comparison with Britain, France and Germany. 
Whereas the latter countries ended up interning almost all male enemy subjects of military 
age caught within their jurisdiction at the outbreak of war,
25
 in Austria this was palpably not 
the case. Pacifying public opinion, which was largely anti-alien, without pandering to the 
                                                             
22 Erlässe des KÜAs, 10 and 15 November 1914. Copies in The National Archives, Kew, London (henceforth 
TNA), FO 383/5, and ÖStA-HHStA, F36, Karton 556, 26/2a, Zl. 14. On the KÜA more generally see T. Scheer, 
Die Ringstraßenfront: Österreich-Ungarn, das Kriegsüberwachungsamt und der Ausnahmezustand während des 
Ersten Weltkrieges, Vienna 2010, esp. 137-144. 
23 See k.u.k. Ministerium des Äussern, Sammlung von Nachweisen für die Verletzungen des Völkerrechts durch 
die mit Österreich-Ungarn kriegführenden Staaten, 4 vols., Vienna 1915-1916, esp. Vol. 1, 55-115 and Vol. 2, 
33-51. 
24 Erlass des KÜAs, 15 November 1914 (as note 22 above). 
25 M. Stibbe, “The Internment of Civilians by Belligerent States During the First World War and the Response 
of the International Committee of the Red Cross”, in: Journal of Contemporary History 41 (2006) 1, 5-19 (here 
esp. 7-8).  
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more extreme elements demanding wholesale internment, was the main objective. As late as 
May 1915, for instance, the American ambassador in Vienna, Frederic C. Penfield, reported 
to his counterpart in London, Walter Hines Page, that only 75 out of an estimated 1286 
British subjects had been interned in Austria, and only three out of an estimated 512 British 
subjects in Hungary.
26
 In line with its desire to present itself as a civilised, law-abiding state, 
the Habsburg Empire also furnished lists of enemy alien internees to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva, and allowed inspection of its camps by Red 
Cross officials and neutral embassies.
27
 And yet there were other, more brutal and 
idiosyncratic features of Habsburg policy which demonstrate that Austria did not simply (and 
reluctantly) follow a pattern that originated elsewhere, but rather made its own contribution to 
the dynamics of internment. 
Firstly, in 1914 Austria was host to a large number of Russian subjects, especially Poles, 
who were deserters from the pre-war Tsarist army and in smaller numbers to Italian migrant 
workers who were in a similar situation.
28
 Men on the run from peacetime conscription or 
military justice in their own countries were not likely to want to return home to join their 
respective armies in the event of hostilities. However, they posed a threat, not only because 
they were aliens and therefore a potential security risk, but also because rising unemployment 
in the first weeks of the war, combined with separation from their families, often rendered 
them destitute or in danger of becoming so. Some were known to the Austrian police as 
                                                             
26 Penfield to Page, 7 May 1915, in: TNA, FO 383/5.  
27 See e.g. Rapports de MM. G. Ador, Dr. F. Ferrière et Dr. de Schulthess-Schindler sur leurs visites à quelques 
camps de prisonniers en Autriche-Hongrie, Geneva, Paris 1915. Copy in: Archives du Comité international de 
la Croix-Rouge, Geneva (henceforth ACICR), C G1, 432/II/4. 
28 T. Scheer, Zwischen Front und Heimat: Österreich-Ungarns Militärverwaltungen im Ersten Weltkrieg, 
Frankfurt am Main 2009, 156.  
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socialists or anarchists and were therefore suspected – in wilder moments of panic – of 
plotting world revolution. Others were accused of being work-shy, or, conversely, of stealing 
jobs from locals. On the other hand, if they were concentrated in camps, they could be 
mobilised as labour for the Austrian war effort, and required to carry out work that the 
indigenous population refused to do. And in effect this is what happened to many of the 
Russians interned in the Austrian interior in 1914, and to some of their Italian counterparts 
taken into captivity in May-June 1915.
29
  
Secondly, Austria-Hungary contributed to the dynamic of wartime captivity through its 
distinctive use of confinement as opposed to internment as a means of controlling more well-
to-do (bemittelte) aliens. Although a version of this policy was also adopted in Italy, where it 
was already permitted, in pre-war times, as a means of combatting domestic subversion,
30
 the 
Dual Monarchy was the first belligerent power to use it against enemy civilians in the First 
World War. Essentially confinement meant expelling “dangerous” but financially 
independent foreign persons from big cities and border regions, and compelling them to live 
under police supervision in certain towns and villages in the Lower Austrian district of 
Waidhofen an der Thaya, such as Drosendorf, Raabs, Karlstein, and Kautzen.
31
 In this way, 
until 1917 only the most destitute British, French and Russian nationals ended up in camps. 
On the surface at least confinement represented an attempt to uphold class privileges in spite 
of the break in international decorum caused by the war, a policy which in respect to 
                                                             
29 Mundschütz, “Das Internierungslager Drosendorf/Thaya”, 11-12. See also H. J. W. Kuprian, “‘Frondienst 
redivivus im XX. Jahrhundert!’: Arbeitszwang am Beispiel von Flucht, Vertreibung und Internierung in 
Österreich während des Ersten Weltkrieges”, in: Geschichte und Region / storia e regione 12 (2003) 1, 15-38.  
30 On the use of confinement or “forced residence”  (domicilio coatto) against suspect aliens and domestic 
enemies in Italy after 1915 see Caglioti, “How and Why Italy”, 161. 
31 Mundschütz, “Internierung im Waldviertel”. 
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treatment of enemy aliens seems to have been taken further in the Habsburg Empire than in 
other warring states.
32
 Indeed, according to Hans Swoboda, “whole colonies of foreigners 
were concentrated in particular locations, where they had a thoroughly pleasant time and, 
depending on their means, had access to every kind of comfort”.33 Yet for formerly wealthy 
aliens whose income was drastically reduced by the war, confinement could be as much a 
hardship as internment itself, especially if it meant being denied access to Red Cross food 
parcels or being exposed to hostility from local communities. As one British woman who was 
confined with her elderly parents to the village of Raabs later complained: ‘[W]e were 
exploited in every way. It was impossible to get accommodation for three people for less than 
K. 90 monthly, which equals about £45 a year […]. Nothing [was] free and nothing cheap. 
The village shops [had] two distinct charges – one for the inhabitants – one for the 
interned”.34 
Thirdly, while all captor powers in the First World War discriminated against or granted 
favourable treatment to particular groups of prisoners according to their nationality or ethnic 
background, there were some distinctive features in the Habsburg case. For a while, for 
instance, British nationals in confinement were given an especially tough time, being 
subjected to very tight curfews and being forbidden – unlike French and Russian aliens – to 
enter pubs, coffee houses or restaurants. This was apparently in retaliation for the poor 
                                                             
32 Preservation of class privileges can more commonly be seen in the superior treatment afforded to officer 
POWs by all captor states during World War I. See e.g. H. Jones, “A Missing Paradigm?  Military Captivity and 
the Prisoner of War, 1914-18”, in: M. Stibbe (ed.), Captivity, Forced Labour and Forced Migration in Europe 
during the First World War, London 2009, 19-48 (here esp. 27-28). 
33 Swoboda, “Zivilinternierte in Österreich”, 229. 
34 D. Cocking, unpublished typewritten report, n.d. [March/April 1918], 1-2, in: TNA, FO 383/364. Cf. the 
similar complaints in: ÖStA-HHStA, F36, Karton 556, 26/2a, Zl. 75.  
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treatment of Austro-Hungarian nationals in Britain and its overseas dominions and colonies.
35
 
The decision to rescind this policy in May 1916 reflected the fact that when it came to 
numbers, Britain had a clear advantage. As it held captive at least 32.440 German and 
Austro-Hungarian civilians by November 1915, it could not be forced to make any 
concessions when it came to discussions over prisoner releases and exchanges.
36
 Besides, 
incoming reports from the American embassy in London eventually forced the Austrian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the KÜA to admit that by and large Britain treated its enemy 
aliens well, indeed better than France and Russia.
37
 As a propaganda and negotiating tool, 
Austria’s reprisal measures against British civilians were therefore of limited value. While it 
is possible but unlikely that they led to some minor improvements for Habsburg subjects in 
Britain and its empire, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs somewhat optimistically claimed in 
late 1915,
38
 in the long run they simply exposed the Dual Monarchy’s weak bargaining 
position and lack of global deterrent power. 
In the meantime, a more serious and prolonged case of discrimination occurred against 
Italian enemy aliens. To some extent this reflected a deliberate calculation on the part of the 
Monarchy that it could target Italians without fear of the consequences because of the much 
smaller number of Habsburg subjects living in Italy.
39
 In addition, there were simply too 
                                                             
35 See Penfield to Page, 7 May 1915, in: TNA, FO 383/5. According to this report, the reprisal measures had 
been in force since November 1914. 
36 Panayi, Prisoners of Britain, 44. 
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many Italian migrants in the Monarchy, many of them poor or destitute, and some of them 
suspected of holding irredentist or anti-Habsburg beliefs, to make confinement or milder 
forms of supervision a viable option. One solution was to send them home. Indeed, after 
86.500 Italians had already fled across the still open border in 1914/1915, a further 42.216, 
mainly women, children and older men, were expelled via neighbouring Switzerland in the 
first weeks of the war.
40
 The 3000 or so Italians who remained – mostly long-term migrants 
of military age and their Austrian-born wives and children – were interned for the duration of 
the war, without being offered the alternative of confinement.
41
 
However, there were more important factors at work in the discriminatory treatment of 
Italians than mere numbers. In political and cultural terms, Italy’s entry into the war in May 
1915 was seen as a great betrayal, because of that country’s previous adherence to the Triple 
Alliance. Rome’s claims to be fighting a “just” war were held in particular contempt; Russia 
and even Serbia were considered more worthy opponents.
42
 On top of this there was a history 
of distrust of irredentist groups on the part of Austrian military officials ever since the 
coming of Italian unity in the 1860s, an enmity which reached its height in July 1916 with the 
brutal execution of Cesare Battisti, an Italian socialist and member of the Austrian parliament 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
German or Habsburg armies, the Austrian authorities had little to lose, even if the Italians did take counter-
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41 Stibbe, “Krieg und Brutalisierung”, 95.  
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[1993], 235; C. Gatterer, Erbfeindschaft Italien-Österreich, Vienna, Munich, Zurich 1972, 153; A. Kramer, 
“Italienische Kriegsgefangene im Ersten Weltkrieg”, in: H. J. Kuprian / O. Überegger (eds.), Der Erste 
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(Reichsrat) who was captured in Italian uniform on the Alpine Front and sentenced to death 
by a court-martial in his hometown of Trent.
43
 While Habsburg subject Italian irredentists 
were seen as traitors, Reichsitaliener (subjects of the pre-war Kingdom of Italy) were often 
regarded with equal misgivings. Baron Gustav von Reicher, for instance, the director of a 
camp set up for enemy aliens at Katzenau bei Linz in Upper Austria in June 1915, was said to 
have a special disdain for all things Italian.
44
 This was in spite of receiving reports from his 
own military censors which revealed that most of the Reichsitaliener who entered his camp 
were indifferent or hostile to Italian intervention and critical of the government in Rome for 
its failure to provide them with adequate food parcels and other means of support.
45
  
In the years 1915-1917 the Italian civilian prisoners in the Monarchy survived on modest 
private packages sent from home and gifts from the Italian Red Cross if they were lucky, and 
basic Habsburg rations if they were not. However, like their military counterparts, in the final 
twelve months of the war they began to suffer from literal starvation.
46
 Many died, 
particularly among the 16.000 or so deported by Habsburg troops from the occupied parts of 
                                                             
43 On Battisti see M. Thompson, The White War: Life and Death on the Italian Front, 1915-1919, London 2008, 
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Friuli and Veneto in the wake of the Italian defeat at the Battle of Caporetto in late 1917.
47
 
Romanians, who were sent as hostages to Drosendorf and Katzenau after their country was 
occupied in December 1916, also fared very badly, especially compared to the British and 
French.
48
 The unequal treatment of nationalities in camps was reinforced by a “divide and 
rule” strategy designed to prevent any feelings of collective solidarity among the internees.49 
Some officials, like Baron von Reicher in Katzenau, even encouraged inmates, especially the 
Italians, to spy on each other and to report breaches of discipline in what would appear to 
have been a specifically Austrian contribution to wartime brutality.
50
   
Last, but by no means least, Austrian internment policies were complex in the sense that 
the original measures, drawn up by the KÜA in August 1914, were directed against both 
enemy aliens and feindliche or verdächtige Inländer, and were intended to deal with both 
groups simultaneously. Already by the end of August 1914 3600 “suspicious people”, both 
Inländer and Ausländer, had been interned in the Austrian half of the empire for reasons of 
“military security”.51 Although Italians were the main targets in May 1915, Serbs were 
deported to camps in the Austrian and Hungarian interiors in even larger numbers, especially 
following the successful military invasion in autumn 1915 and again after the Romanian 
declaration of war in August 1916.
52
 The same considerations of “military security” were also 
behind the suspension of constitutional rights on the home front and the frame-up trials 
                                                             
47 See A. Kramer, Dynamic of Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War, Oxford 2007, 60-
61. 
48 On the treatment of Romanian civilians see the archival sources in: ÖStA-HHStA, F36, Karton 602, 45/2a. 
49 Mundschütz, “Das Internierungslager Drosendorf/Thaya”, 34-36. 
50 Haller, “Das Internierungslager Katzenau”, 61; Stibbe, “Krieg und Brutalisierung”, 97. 
51 Mundschütz, “Das Internierungslager Drosendorf/Thaya”, 15-16. 
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conducted by military courts against nationalist politicians like Karel Kramář, a Czech 
member of the Reichsrat who was accused – on the basis of no hard evidence – of treason 
against the empire.
53
 Although the army was the driving force behind such measures, as early 
as 23 July the Ministry of Interior wrote to the District Commissioner for Lower Austria: 
 
It is also important to ensure that untrustworthy or unreliable domestic subjects who 
are suspected of conspiring with the enemy or who might hamper the mobilisation 
measures are rendered harmless in the event of a state of emergency or mobilisation 
order [...]. A pretext for this could be those parts of the criminal law that deal with 
high treason, espionage [and] threats to public order and peace [...].
54
 
 
The language used here – “to render harmless” or “unschädlich zu machen” – is in itself 
revealing, both of the mentality behind Austria’s labyrinthine internment system and of its 
place in a transnational, pan-European and global dynamic of violence. It confirms Alan 
Kramer’s argument that here was no one model of violence against civilians during the 
1914/1918 conflict, but rather several models that interacted with each other to unleash a 
“radicalisation of war” which extended to “all fronts in Europe and the Near East”, including 
the home fronts. Only in one state, the Ottoman Empire, did this “dynamic of destruction” get 
pushed as far as genocide. In others, including Austria-Hungary, the quest for military 
security had murderous, rather than genocidal consequences.
55
 Even so, decisions for 
internment and the assumptions behind these decisions were often closely linked to how the 
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54 Austrian Ministry of Interior to the Statthalter of Lower Austria, 23 July 1914, in: NÖLA, Präs. P. Zl. 384 SA 
ex 1914 (Karton 691). 
55 Kramer, Dynamic of Destruction, 3 and 68. 
19 
 
war was conducted in the fighting zones. In Austria’s case, this can be seen most clearly in 
the evacuation and deportation measures implemented in areas of the Monarchy identified as 
most vulnerable to enemy infiltration, espionage and subversion. 
 
2. Political Suspects Deported from War Zones  
In addition to interning or confining enemy aliens and seizing enemy civilians as hostages in 
occupied territories, the Habsburg military also deported large numbers of domestic political 
“suspects” from war zones and volatile frontier districts. Three main ethnic groups were 
targeted: Bosnian Serbs, Ruthenians or western Ukrainians suspected of pro-Russian 
sympathies, and, as mentioned above, alleged Italian irredentists. This in turn appeared to 
contradict the army’s own intention to mobilise all Habsburg subjects behind the war effort 
and maintain the inner cohesion between the different nationalities that made up the Empire. 
It also forced moderate Slav and Italian nationalists to take up increasingly critical positions, 
so that the Monarchy began to lose support even among hitherto loyal sections of the 
population.   
After 1918, both erstwhile servants and opponents of the Monarchy exaggerated the role 
played by Allied propaganda in stirring up nationalist feeling, in effect blaming outside 
forces, especially the British and French, for Austria’s woes.56 However, in reality the 
deportations had internal rather than external causes. In particular they were related to the 
Monarchy’s chief strategic aim pre- and post-1914: to enhance the military strength of the 
empire and especially military security in border regions, while at the same time maintaining 
a steady recruitment of loyal soldiers from these regions into an ethnically-neutral Austro-
Hungarian army. For pessimists among Austria’s rulers in particular, the balance between 
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centrifugal forces (civic and ethnic nationalism) and centripetal forces (loyalty to the 
Emperor Franz Joseph and his heirs, service in the military and/or imperial bureaucracy) had 
to be decisively redrawn in favour of the latter if the Habsburg state were to survive in its 
current form.
57
 “Traitors”, whether in the borderlands or in the interior, stood in the way of 
this. 
In the years leading up to the war, “ethnic recognition” began to emerge as an alternative 
way of imagining citizenship and belonging in the Austrian half of the empire. Under this 
model the state could acknowledge the existence of separate nations in a civic rather than 
territorial sense, allowing subjects of the Monarchy to exercise common rights, such as 
voting or sending their children to school, by identifying themselves individually as members 
of a legally-constituted national group or community.
58
 Reformers believed this policy would 
strengthen imperial loyalties by meeting the demands of moderate nationalists, but in reality 
it had a destabilising effect, especially as it was dialectically linked to its opposite, the revival 
of interest in Habsburg imperial expansion. The army, for instance, not only repeatedly urged 
preventative war against Austria’s external enemies,59 but at home remained the bastion of 
conservative, neo-absolutist values, opposing any accommodation with nationalism and 
upholding a rigid commitment to ethnic neutrality which it pursued most keenly in relation to 
the imperial subjugation of the population of occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina – whether Serb, 
Croat, Muslim, Jew or other – after 1878.60 Cultural and administrative modernisation 
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through the promotion of a supra-national Austrophilism was directed at all of Bosnia’s 
ethnic/confessional groups simultaneously, with mixed results before 1914.
61
 More generally, 
as István Deák has shown, wherever they served in the empire, members of the Habsburg 
officer corps, from field marshals to career officers of lower rank, still “viewed themselves as 
‘Austrians’” and “the great majority […] never admitted to a specific nationality”. Rather 
“their unconditional loyalty was to the emperor”.62 
In the Austrian interior, including border regions before 1914/15, the army and its officer 
corps admittedly had less direct political influence over what was an increasingly 
multinational and polyglot (although still very elitist) imperial bureaucracy. For example, it 
failed to prevent the Moravian Compromise, a series of agreements between Czech and 
German provincial leaders in 1905 allowing for division along ethnic/linguistic lines, 
particularly in the spheres of political representation and children’s education.63 Nonetheless, 
conservative forces were able to block the creation of an Italian-speaking university in 
Trieste, which opponents believed would become a breeding ground for irredentism.
64
 And 
indeed Italian nationalists in the Alpine frontier districts, like Serbs in Bosnia and 
“russophile” Ukrainian suspects in eastern Galicia, were closely monitored by the secret 
police and military intelligence.
65
 Arbitrary lists were drawn up of individuals to be arrested 
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in the event of hostilities with Italy, and plans were laid for the use of detention without trial 
against presumed internal enemies.  
Current literature puts a big emphasis on the fate of Italian subjects of the Monarchy 
deported as alleged irredentists from Trieste, Gorizia, the Trentino and elsewhere in May and 
June 1915, 12.000 of whom were sent to internment camps.
66
 Among them were many local 
priests, doctors, lawyers, teachers and government officials; from Trieste alone some 73 
persons employed in the state and communal administration were arrested.
67
 In fact, though, 
even greater levels of violence were used against around 7000 suspected “russophile” 
Ruthenians sent to Thalerhof near Graz during the chaotic retreat from eastern Galicia 
following the initial Russian advances in autumn 1914. Some 1767 of them died, with most 
deaths occurring in the winter of 1914/1915. There were also reports of beatings and 
torture.
68
 The deportations of autumn 1914 were accompanied by other acts of violence, 
including hostage-taking, burning of houses and schools, harassment and even murder of 
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Orthodox priests, and summary hangings of alleged spies.
69
 The novelist Joseph Roth later 
gave a vivid depiction of this in The Radetzky March:  
 
Secret informants supplied unverifiable reports on peasants, priests, teachers, 
photographers, civil servants. There was no time. They were in a hurry to retreat, but 
also in a hurry to punish the traitors [...] For many days the real or supposed traitors 
were left dangling on trees in the church squares, as an example to the living. But far 
and wide the living had fled.
70
 
  
At around the same time similar actions took place in Bosnia in the wake of the failure of 
initial Austrian military campaigns against Serbia.
71
 Hostage-taking and public executions 
were commonplace. Bosnian Serb “suspects” selected for deportation were sent to terrible 
camps at Arad, Neszider and Gyöngyös in Hungary where again many died in the winter of 
1914/1915. Others were held on starvation rations in camps in Bosnia itself.
72
 
Four further points can be made about this group of internees. Firstly, because many of 
them were Habsburg subjects (or, in the case of Bosnian Serbs, de facto colonial subjects) 
rather than subjects of enemy states, they did not appear on any Red Cross lists and did not 
enjoy the formal protection of neutral powers. The ICRC also had to work hard to persuade 
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the authorities in Vienna to furnish lists of Serb and Italian nationals held in mixed camps 
alongside domestic deportees.
73
 Secondly, although these measures did not generate as much 
international publicity as the deportation of Belgians to Germany in 1916,
74
 the common 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna did receive a number of complaints through private and 
diplomatic channels, notably from the Vatican, the ICRC and the American and Spanish 
governments. However, its concern to respond constructively to these complaints was often 
overruled by the Army Supreme Command (AOK), which continued to insist that harsh 
measures were necessary to ensure “military security”.75 As the Austrian parliament, the 
Reichsrat, was suspended from March 1914 to May 1917, there was no internal mechanism 
for challenging the army in this respect.  
Thirdly, a significant proportion of deportees were middle-class professionals and their 
wives and families, that is lawyers, dentists, doctors, even clergymen and elected Reichsrat 
politicians suspected, often on the basis of malicious denunciations and other inaccurate 
information, of treasonable activities against the Monarchy. They were interned, in other 
words, for political reasons and were not systematically used as forced labour. In some 
instances, though, notably at Thalerhof, the prisoners from middle-class backgrounds, and 
especially the women, were singled out for particular forms of humiliating treatment that 
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were designed to destroy their gender and class identities, such as being made to clean 
lavatories or scrub floors. Photographs were even taken of the women bathing, with the 
victims forced to pose naked in front of the guards, according to one eye-witness account 
given to British intelligence officers in northern Italy in 1916.
76
    
Finally, the amnesty for domestic political suspects issued by the new Kaiser Karl in May 
1917 did at least bring some relief to those of the internees who were Austrian subjects, 
including political prisoners like Kramář who had earlier faced the death penalty.77 However, 
this amnesty was at best a half measure only, because many of those released from camps or 
prisons were still not allowed to return to their homes in border regions and were in effect 
confined to the interior. Others were re-arrested in 1918 on suspicion of political agitation. 
Critics of the wartime regime, in particular nationalist deputies in the newly-recalled 
Reichsrat, immediately interpreted this as a reflection of the unequal treatment of subject 
nationalities by the military authorities, exposing the hollowness of the army’s claim that it 
had applied emergency state-of-siege measures on an impartial and ethnically-neutral basis. 
Similar complaints were also made with regard to the Ministry of Interior’s policy on 
refugees, who shall be the final group under consideration here. 
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3. Refugees from War Zones 
Between 1914 and 1918 hundreds of thousands of civilians were forced from their homes by 
the fighting and driven to seek refuge in the Austrian and Hungarian hinterland. According to 
the Austrian Ministry of Interior’s own statistics there were already 291.459 internally-
displaced refugees in the western provinces of the Monarchy by December 1915. However, 
recent research indicates that the true figure was probably closer to one million.
78
 Some of 
these refugees had fled their homes in war zones, while others had been compulsorily 
evacuated by the army. Those with independent financial means or with families willing to 
support them were able to live in relative freedom. However, a growing number of destitute 
refugees – 130.000 in Austria by the end of 1915 – were crammed into vast Barackenlager 
(refugee camps) set up on the orders of the Ministry of Interior in places such as Braunau am 
Inn in Upper Austria, Mitterndorf and Pottendorf in Lower Austria, Wagna bei Leibnitz in 
Styria, Deutsch Brod and Chotzen in Bohemia, and Nikolsburg, Pohrlitz and Gaya in 
Moravia. Here they were segregated from hostile local populations and generally regarded as 
a drain on food supplies and a potential threat in terms of disease, especially the Jewish 
refugees from eastern Galicia and Bukovina.
79
   
Although there was a theoretical and administrative distinction between the Barackenlager 
and the Interniertenlager and Konfinierungsstationen discussed above, in practice refugees 
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were as much prisoners as the civilian internees and could only leave if they were willing to 
risk losing their jobs and/or state and charitable relief. Those found to have returned to 
frontier districts without official permits also faced arrest and possible prosecution in a 
military court. In this sense, Walter Mentzel is correct to say that the Barackenlager “were in 
effect internment camps” (“waren praktisch Interniertenlager”).80 In certain circumstances it 
was even better to be an internee than a refugee. In the second half of 1915, for instance, 
huge numbers of Slovene, Croat and Italian refugees, especially children, died in 
overcrowded camps in the Austrian interior, while the Italian internees in Katzenau were at 
that time relatively well-fed and well-housed, especially as the camp allowed access to 
inspection teams sent by the ICRC and the American embassy in Vienna.
81
 The Italian 
Foreign Minister Sidney Sonnino even described the camp director at Katzenau, Baron von 
Reicher, as a “gentleman” after reading an American inspection report in March 1917.82 At 
Katzenau, Drosendorf and other internment camps the inmates were also allowed a certain 
amount of internal autonomy over their own affairs, including camp finances and the 
purchase of food, and each nationality present was allowed to elect its own Vertrauensmann 
to represent them on the camp council (Verwaltungskommission).
83
 By contrast, at the 
Barackenlager at Wagna bei Leibnitz no such representation existed and conditions had got 
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so bad by late 1917 that there was even a riot there after soldiers accidentally shot dead a 
child.
84
   
Other abuses were already well-documented and became the subject of complaints from 
nationalist deputies in the Reichsrat after it was reconvened in late May 1917, forcing the 
government to back down and introduce a new refugee law which came into effect in 
December 1917.
85
 The army and the Ministry of Interior now found themselves in the 
uncomfortable position of having their policies probed by representatives of the people acting 
under the protection of parliamentary immunity. Alcide De Gasperi, the moderate Catholic 
politician from the Trentino (and future Christian-Democrat Italian statesman) who had run 
an official charity for Italian-speaking refugees from his involuntary wartime base in Vienna, 
was one of the most vocal critics. On 12 July 1917, for instance, he condemned what he 
described as the “spectre of evacuation” (Evakuierungsgeist) and “spectre of persecution” 
(Verfolgungsgeist) which had led to the “criminal” incarceration of so many Austrian Italians 
in “concentration camps” in the days and weeks after the outbreak of war with Italy in May 
1915: “Refugees were not treated like citizens, but [...] like administrative units 
[Verwaltungsobjekte][...] They were evacuated, body-searched, dispatched [and] placed in 
barracks, as if they had no will of their own, and no rights”.86 In Upper Austria, he continued, 
“where a particularly harsh approach was taken, the refugees were told: either you agree to go 
to the concentration camp at Braunau [am Inn] or, if you chose to remain outside, you lose all 
financial support”.  
Only when refugees achieved recognition as war victims with an absolute right to choose 
between being re-housed in a camp or in a government-approved settlement area would such 
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abuses come to an end, De Gasperi concluded. In the same speech he also emphasised the 
much better opportunities that enemy aliens in Interniertenlager like Katzenau had for self-
administration. Refugees with Austrian citizenship, he argued, should also be able to 
determine their own affairs and to take part in the administration of camps on the basis of 
equality and “in line with communal organisations in their homeland”.87  
In this way, De Gasperi sought to defend the rights of his constituents, namely the 114.000 
men, women and children from the Trentino, representing up to one third of the entire Italian-
speaking population of Austrian-ruled Tyrol, who had fled or been compulsorily evacuated 
from their homes since May 1915.
88
 His use of the term “concentration camp” was deliberate. 
Although a Habsburg loyalist, over time his faith in the imperial system and its “impartiality” 
had begun to waver. Yet even he was taken by surprise by the sudden end of the Dual 
Monarchy following the German military collapse on the western front in October-November 
1918. In the new republic of German-Austria, as in other successor states of the Habsburg 
Empire, citizenship was defined on a more ethnically-exclusive basis, with German 
nationality now becoming the main criterion. Large numbers of non-German refugees who 
had previously regarded themselves as Austrians and patriotic subjects of the Emperor were 
now reclassified  by state administrators as  “foreign nationals” or “aliens” (“fremde 
Staatsangehörige” or “Ausländer”) who no longer enjoyed automatic residency or 
entitlement to welfare payments.
89
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In the months that followed hundreds of thousands of persons falling into this category left 
the territory of German-Austria for an uncertain future as citizens of the newly-formed or 
newly-enlarged nation-states situated beyond its borders, or for a life of permanent 
refugeedom. Italians were among the more lucky ones, and were able to return to their home 
regions fairly quickly. Refugees from the East, on the other hand, including those who had 
fled fresh fighting between Poles and Ukrainians in 1919, were subjected to on-going 
hostility from the Austrian authorities and many were forcibly expelled. In 1920 the Christian 
Social politician Leopold Kunschak, in continuity with attitudes that had already developed 
during the war, publicly demanded that Jewish refugees of non-(German)Austrian nationality 
who refused to leave voluntarily be held in “concentration camps” pending deportation.90   
 
4. Conclusions 
Civilian internment in the First World War cannot be fully understood without taking 
practices in Austria-Hungary into account. Above all the Habsburg experience demonstrates 
that there was no single model of internment but several different systems that interacted and 
overlapped with each other. For instance, there was the internment and confinement of enemy 
aliens which implied a xenophobic-nationalist (re)mobilisation of the Monarchy, ending the 
open policy of the pre-war era that had allowed relatively free entry to foreign workers, 
businessmen and deserters across Austria’s borders. There was also the internment of 
domestic political suspects which was intended, alongside the suspension of the Reichsrat, to 
bring about a depoliticisation or internal demobilisation of the nationalities question as part of 
a neo-absolutist resurrection of empire. Allied propaganda, buttressed by the work of exiles, 
sought to exploit the subsequent nationalist resentments, but, as Mark Cornwall has 
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convincingly argued, these “external threats” to the Monarchy’s survival, while important, 
should not obscure the fact that the real danger “emanated […] from Austria-Hungary’s own 
unsatisfactory internal situation”, now made worse by the refusal to consider alternatives to 
violence and authoritarianism.
91
 Last but not least there was the situation in frontier zones 
when Habsburg troops came into contact with what they saw as hostile, disloyal or 
treacherous populations. The latter were victims of an imperialist mistrust of internal national 
movements, especially in border regions, and a desire to uphold a supra-ethnic, militarised 
vision of empire that ultimately failed. 
In all of these cases, the means used to secure the supposed interests of “military security” 
were draconian and served to replace traditional notions of ethnic impartiality and 
Gerechtigkeit, the very basis of the nineteenth-century Austrian conception of the state and of 
the Habsburgs’ claim to legitimacy,92 with very narrow definitions of patriotic loyalty and a 
more or less open discrimination against particular national groups. The impulse for this 
came “from above”, especially from the centripetal force of the military and its instrument on 
the home front, the KÜA. The army’s intention was to safeguard the Monarchy from 
perceived internal and external threats. However, by feeding into and exacerbating existing 
national conflicts and ethnic hatreds, the policy also unleashed countervailing centrifugal 
forces that probably had a more lasting impact after 1918.
93
 This “ethnicisation” of politics94 
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can be seen in particular in the increasing hostility between German-, Italian- and Slovene-
speakers in all of Austria’s Alpine provinces, a phenomenon which pre-dated but was 
reinforced by the army’s evacuation measures in May 1915.95 It was equally evident in 
popular demands before and after 1918 for (stateless) Jewish and Polish refugees to be 
isolated and expelled, even though official Habsburg policy was pro-Polish and pro-Jewish, 
both groups being recognised as anti-Russian.
96
 
However, if Vienna’s policy towards enemy aliens and domestic political suspects had 
certain distinctive features linked especially to its harsh conduct of the war in the frontier 
zones, there was also a transnational dynamic of internment and related brutalities, which the 
Habsburg Empire, like other warring states, clearly contributed to. The wave of rapid 
globalisation and accompanying mass migration of people and ideas at the end of the 
nineteenth century had already served to undermine neat distinctions between “liberal” 
western and “despotic” eastern models of citizenship, ethnic “belonging” and political 
rights.
97
 This process was further accelerated by the increased concentration of economic and 
military power and imperialist exploitation of local nationalisms and ethnic grievances on all 
sides during the Great War and its immediate aftermath, whether in Europe, the Near East or 
elsewhere. The creation of many new nation-states with redrawn but hardly more secure or 
                                                             
95 See e.g. the evidence in Kuprian, “‘Entheimatungen’”, esp. 291-292; Gatterer, Erbfeindschaft, esp. 90 and 
143-147; and Pircher, Militär, esp. 101-104 and 117-120. 
96 Hoffmann-Holter, „Abreisendmachung“. See also the evidence of resentment in Upper Austria towards 
Jewish refugees in: OÖLA, Statthalterei 1850-1926, Bestand Erster Weltkrieg, Schachteln 41-42.   
97 Gammerl, Staatsbürger, esp. 344-345.   
33 
 
permanent borders in the peace settlement of 1919-1920, far from reducing these tensions, 
actually made them worse.
98
   
For this reason we may also have to rethink what Robin Okey refers to as the “default 
demonisation of the ethnic or national element in conflict situations” in the (non-western) 
world since 1900.
99
 The tendency to link inter-ethnic or religious-sectarian violence with 
supposed deviations from the ideal model of the “liberal”, “tolerant” or “civic-minded” 
nation-state with stable frontiers and government bound by rule of law has become even more 
pronounced in the wake of the terrible events in Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s (and 
since then in Chechnya, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Syria, Crimea, Ukraine and elsewhere). 
However, such judgements speak more to western assumptions about what is “normal” than 
to complex historical realities. More revealing, in fact, is to look at the inter-connectedness, 
perhaps even the dialectical relationship between imperialism on the one hand and ethnic 
nationalisms on the other. The case of Habsburg Austria in the First World War, its 
internment policies and quest for military security on its borders, and its reactions to real and 
imagined social and political threats on these borders pre- and post-1914, is, I would argue, a 
classic example of this. It was not just a “second hand” echo. 
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